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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
CHESTER G. VERNIER AND HAROLD SHEPHERD
ACQUITTAL.
Duvall v. State, Ohio, 146 N. E. 90. Acquittal of murder uphile attempting
to rob no bar to prosecution for robbery.
An acquittal of a defendant upon the charge of murder in the first degree,
while attempting to perpetrate a robbery (under Sec. 12400, General 'Code), is
not a bar to a prosecution for the crime of robbery (under Sec. 12432, General
Code), even though committed upon the same person named in the former
charge, and the robbery was a part of the same criminal act referred to in the
indictment for murder.
ADULTERY.
Lee v. State, Okla., 231 Pac. 324. Effect of divorce of injured party on
prosecution for adultery.
If, after the prosecution has been commenced, the offense has been condoned
by the injured party, it my be to the interest of the parties, as well as to the
best interest of society, that the prosecution be discontinued; but, where the
act has not been condoned, the injured party may still insist that the prosecution
be carried on, notwithstanding the fact that pending the prosecution the marital
relation has ceased because of a divorce procured by the offending spouse.
ALIBI.
People v. Nichols, Calif. D. C. A., 230 Pac. 997. Error to asperse defense
of alibi.
Instruction that defense of alibi was entitled to full weight when established,
but that jury should scrutinize testimony offered in support of alibi with care,
that it might "be satisfied that a fabricated defense" is not being made, held
reversible error as imposing upon defendant burden of establishing such defense,
and casting suspicion upon his defense and evidence produced in 9upport thereof.
ARRAIGNMENT.
State v. Nihzch, Wash., 230 Pac. 129. Failure to arraign before empaneling
jury.
Where, after empaneling of jury and opening statement of counsel, court's
attention was called to fact defendant had not been arraigned, and defendant
was then arraigned, and, standing mute, court ordered plea of not guilty, and
trial proceeded; no request being made for additional time to plead nor for con-
tinuance, action of court was mere irregularity not affecting defendant's sub-
stantial rights.
ATTEiPT.
State v. McCarthy, Kans., 224 Pac. 44.
A conviction upon a charge of attempting to commit burglary of freight
cars is sustained by evidence tending to show these facts: One of the four
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defendants obtained an agreement with a car inspector of the Missouri Pacific
Railway at Atchison to cause cars on a specified freight train from Kansas City
to be held at Atchison so as to give them an opportunity to get their contents.
The defendants drove at night from Kansas City in two automobiles, containing
a shotgun, revolvers, lanterns, wrenches, a screw driver, and a jimmy, and on
arriving at Atchison stopped about 300 feet from the railroad track near where
it entered the yards. Two of them went in search of the car inspector, but, after
finding him, either became suspicious that he was acting in co-operation with the
police and therefore abandoned their purpose, or else left him with an agreement
to meet them in half an hour where their automobiles were parked. They were
taken into custody, and the arrest of the others followed at the place where they
had stopped.
This conclusion is not affected by evidence that the freight train did not
arrive until the next morning and that the defendant, who made the arrange-
ment with the car inspector, at one time in conversation with the others re-
ferred to the plan as one for receiving stolen goods.
BImBEY.
People v. Neunnark, IIl., 144 N. E. 338. Meaning of "juror" in briber"
statute.
Cr. Code, Sec. 33, making it a crime to corrupt or attempt to corrupt "any
juror," held applicable to person selected for jury service under Juror Act, Sec. 8,
though strictly speaking a "juror" is one who has been sworn to try a cause.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
State v. Morse, Ariz., 226 Pac. 537. Validity of statute punishing obtaining
labor by false pretenses.
A statute making it a crime, punishable by imprisonment, to fail to pay debt
is in violation of Const. Art. 2, Sec. 18, but Pen. Code 1913, Sec. 524, as amended
by Laws 1919, c. 163, Sec. 1, and Laws 1921, c. 26, See. 1, does not make it a
crime merely to neglect to pay wages, but penalizes obtaining labor by false
pretenses, and is not invalid. /
State v. Franklin, Utah, 226 Pac. 674. Validity of statute authorizing im-
position of jail sentences in proceedings to enjoin liquor nuisances. -
Provision of Comp. Laws 1917, Sec. 4282, authorizing imposition of jail
sentences on persons found guilty of maintaining liquor nuisance, as defined by
Sec. 3350, in injunction proceedings under Sec. 4276, is unauthorized and con-
trary to Const. Art. 1, Secs. 10, 12, relating to right to jury trial.
Commonwealth v. Boston Transcript Co., Mass., 144 N. E. 400. Validity of
statute requiring newspapers to publish findings of minimum wage commission.
G. L. c. 151, Secs. 12, 13, punishing any newspaper refusing to publish pro-
ceedings of minimum wage commission at regular rates, is invalid, as inter-
fering with right of contract, under Const. pt. 1, Declaration of Rights, Arts. 1,
10, 12.
Publishers of newspapers are subject to reasonable legislative regulation,
but are not affected with public interest, so as to stand on less favorable ground
with respect to legislative regulations than ordinary person.
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State v. Putney, Ore., 224 Pac. 279. Validity of statute giving women right
to claim exemption from jury service.
Or. L. See. 991, as amended by Laws 1921, c. 273, Sec. 6, par. 11, giving
women the right to claim exemption from jury service, held not violative of
Const. Art. 1, Sec. 20, providing that no law shall be passed granting to any
citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities which upon the same terms
shall not equally belong to all citizens.
CORPORATIONS.
State v. Truax, et al., Wash., 226 Pac. 259. Indictment of corporation for
crime punishable by imprisonment only.
An indictment, charging a corporation with a crime which is punishable
only by imprsionment, is not good because of the impossibility of inflicting such
punishment.
Indictment against bank for grand larceny, based on Rem. Comp. Stat. Sec.
2601, punishment for which, under Sec. 2605, is imprisonment in state peni-
tentiary for not more than 15 years, held not to charge against bank a crime as
defined by Sec. 2253, because of impossibility of inflicting punishment; Sec. 2265,
punishing by imprisonment or fine one convicted of a felony for which no
punishment is specially "prescribed," being inapplicable; "prescribed" denoting
to lay down authoritatively as a guide, direction, or rule; to impose as a
peremptory order; to dictate; to point; to direct.
CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM.
Ex parte Moore, Ida., 224 Pac. 662. "Sabotage."
Held, that by the use of the word "sabotage," in the criminal syndicalism
law, the legislature of this state did not include striking on the job.
Budge, J., and McCarthy, C. J., dissenting.
EVIDENCE.
Committi v. State, Okla., 231 Pac. 316. Adnissibility of evidence secured
by unlawful search warrant.
Evidence obtained by a search of the defendant's home, under a search war-
rant issued without authority of law, for the sole purpose of obtaining evidence
against him, in violation of Bill of Rights, Sec. 30, guaranteeing the security of
the people in their right to be exempt in their persons, houses, and effects from
unreasonable searches and seizures, is inadmissible against him.
State v. Johnson, Kans., 226 Pac. 245. Admissibility of evidence illegally
seized.
A liquor still and apparatus taken from a dwelling house during the owner's
absence, by the sheriff and county attorney, acting without semblance of lawful
authority to search or seize, may be retained by the sheriff, and may be used as
evidence in a criminal prosecution against the possessor for maintaining a liquor
nuisance, although he made timely application to the court for return of the





People ex rel Gottschalk v. Brown, Sheriff, N. Y., 143 N. E. 653. Extradi-
tion for non-support.
A divorced husband, indicted in Ohio for non-support of his children during
a period during which he visited Ohio on two occasions for a few hours, was
subject to extradition as a fugitive from justice.
Hiscock, C. J., and McLaughlin and Andrews, J.J., dissenting.
"It may be conceded that this relator entered the state of Ohio for an
innocent purpose and that he committed there no overt act in furtherance of the
crime with which he is charged, but that charge by its very nature is founded
not upon the commission of overt acts, but upon the neglect of a duty. Guilty
intent may be presumed from the neglect of duty, and the crime continues as
long as the neglect does not cease. There is no evidence conclusive or other-,
wise that at the very time the relator was in Ohio he was not guilty of failure
to provide for his children; in fact he admits that because of disagreement with
his wife as to the custody of his children he had discontinued the payment of an
allowance for their support. Absence of overt acts is irrelevant when the
charge is founded only upon neglect of duty, and the innocence of the purpose
with which the relator entered the state cannot affect his guilt while there, if the
neglect which forms the basis of the charge continued during that time."
FoRiSmE JEOPARDY.
Cumpton v. City of Muskogee, Okla., 225, Pac. 562. Whether prosecution
under municipal ordinance bars prosecution.under state law.
A prosecution in a city court for violation of a municipal ordinance which
prohibits an act which is also an offense under the general criminal law of the
state is not a bar to a prosecution under such state law; such a second prosecu-
tion would not be in conflict with Sec. 21 of our Bill of Rights, providing that
no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
The violation of a municipal ordinance is an offense against the municipality,
and the same facts and circumstances may constitute another and different
offense against the state, the same facts constituting different offenses against
different governing bodies.
Watson v. State, Okla., 224 Pac. 368.
The granting of a new trial to a defendant convicted of petit larceny, upon
an information for grand larceny, is not a bar to another trial under the same
information for the higher offense.
"There is a great and irreconcilable conflict of authority as to the effect of
a new trial granted at the instance of the defendant, in cases where he was con-
victed of a lower degree of the offense charged, or a lower offense embraced
within the charge laid in the indictment or information. The main reason
underlying this conflict arises from the fundamental difference in the judicial
construction of the nature of the verdict in such cases. All adjudications are a
unit on the proposition that a verdict of conviction of a lower offense embraced
within the offense charged is an implied acquittal of the'higher offense embraced
within the offense charged, but some of the courts hold that such a verdict is an
entirety, and cannot be severed and must stand or fall as an entirety, so when a
new trial is granted it opens up the whole controversy anew, and the defendant,
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by obtaining a new trial on his own motion, waives the former jeopardy, not
only as to the offense of which he was convicted, but also as to the one of
which he was thereby impliedly acquitted."
HoMICIDE.
Harding v. State, Ariz., 225 Pac. 482. Manslaughter; unintentional killing
in effecting arrest.
Where peace officer, in attempting to arrest a drunken driver, shot at a
tire to disable automobile, and killed driver, even though killing was uninten-
tional, his act being unlawful, offense was, in view of Pen. Code 1913, Secs. 175,
1046, involuntary manslaughter.
State v. Scott, Kans., 231 Pac. 56. Error to exchde circumstantial evidence
to connect another with homicide.
In a trial for murder, committed by one person in a residence, the state
-relied upon circumstantial evidence. The defendant's theory was that the
murder was committed by an intruder fearing identification, and offered evidence
tending to show that within five minutes after the homicide a named person,
whose home was in another town and who had a penal record for burglary,
larceny, and similar crimes, was observed near the scene of the homicide, and
that he made his escape from the city in a few hours, and undertook by cir-
cumstantial evidence to connect him with the homicide. Held, it was error to
exclude this evidence.
Hopkins, J., and Johnston, C. H., dissenting.
State v. Jackson, Mont., 230 Pac. 370. When killing by bank robber during
pursuit after robbery is committed in perpetration of robbery.
Where bank was robbed, and pursuit immediately began and continued until
bank robber killed pursuer 30 miles from bank, and over hour after robbery,
whether killing was committed in perpetration of robbery, within Rev. Codes
1921, Sec. 10955, defining first degree murder, held for jury, in view of Sec.
10973.
"It cannot be said, therefore, as a matter of law, that the crime of robbery
was complete at the time of the wounding of McKain, and it was entirely proper
to submit the question for determination by the jury from all the facts proven.
The cases of Conrad v. State, 75 Ohio St. 52, 78 N. E. 957, 6 L. R. A. ( . s.)
1154, 8 Ann. Cas. 966, and State v. Habig, supra, and in effect Francis v. State,
104 Neb. 5, 175 N. W. 675, support the above reasoning on facts exhibiting less
continuity of action than are here presented.
"People v. Huter, 184 N. Y. 237, 77 N. E. 6; Dolan v. People, 64 N. Y. 485;
People v. Wardrip, 141 Cal. 229, 74 P. 744-cted and relied upon by the de-
fendant-deal with murders perpetrated in connection with burglaries, and in
each instance the shooting occurred, not while the bandit was in the act of
breaking and entering, but after he had abandoned that course, or had effected
a breaking and entering and was in flight. In other words, in those cases it can
be argued that the felon's original course of action and intent had ceased when
the killing occurred, though the reasoning in Conrad v. State, supra, seems to us
more persuasive. There actions and intentions were in process of fulfillment.
The decision in Griffin v. Western Mutual Benefit Assi., 20 Neb.-620, 31 N. W.
124, 57 Am. Rep. 848, rests on a refinement of analysis which we are unable to
JUDICIAL DECISIONS 159
appreciate. It itemizes and separates the incidental movements in an unbroken
action in much the same manner as slow motion pictures make fiction of fact.
No authority is cited, and the facts stated in that opinion do not justify the
conclusion there reached. There is nothing in Pleimling v. State, 46 Wis. 516,
1 N. W. 278, nor Hoffman v. State, 88 Wis. 166, 59 N. W. 588, inconsistent
with the views here expressed."
INDICTMENT.
State v. Gauthier, Ore., 231 Pac. 141. Use of "person" for "child"; failure
to allege prosecutrix unmarried.
Under Or. L. Sec. 1437, prescriblng requirements, an indictment under Sec.
1912, charging statutory rape, is not vitiated by substitution there-n of the word
"person" for "child" in clause alleging the assault on and sexual intercourse
with a female person of the age of 13 years; a "child" being specifically a very
young person, one not old enough to dispense with maternal aid and care.
In view of Or. L. Sec. 9720, fixing the age at-which legal marriage may be
contracted by female at 15 years, the allegation of prosecutrix's age in indict-
ment, under Sec. 1912, for statutory rape, as 13 years, precludes the inference
that she was married, and such fact need not in any event be alleged.
State v. Polich, Mont., 226 Pac. 519. Crerical misprision of date.
In view of Rev. Codes 1921, Secs. 11853, 11874, providing no indictment or
information shall be insufficient for non-prejudicial defect in form or error or
mistake, and in view of Sec. 11848, where time was not essence of crime as in
case of prosecution for selling liquor, clercial misprision charging defendant
on September 4, A. D., 19122, with unlawful sale held not prejudicial.
INSANITY.
People v. Little, Calif. D. C. A., 230 Pac. 178. Insanity at time of trial.
Where a request is made, under Pen. Code, Secs. 1367, 1368, to have ac-
cused's present insanity determined, trial court is not required to submit that
question to jury in advance of trial, where evidence submitted in support of
request does not create doubt in judge's mind as to accused's insanity.
Even if presumption that insanity, once shown, continues until contrary is
shown is applicable in criminal cases, fact of accused's having previously been
committed to an insane asylum, while an important circumstance in tending to
establish his later insanity, as when he committed the act for which he was on
trial, amounted to no more than a circumstance to be considered with all the
other evidence on the question.
Commonwealth v. Barnes, Pa., 124 At. 636. Construction of statute author-
izing removal of insane prisoner to hospital.
A Salvation Army ensign could not petition for removal of an insane pris-
oner to a hospital under Act July 11, 1923, Sec. 308 (Pa. St. Supp., 1924, Sec.
14726a-308), since the term "other responsible person" or "responsible officer of
the institution or other person" used therein must be read under the ejusdem
generis rule as referring to persons connected with or in some measure re-
sponsible for the care of the prisoner in question.
INTOXICATING LIQUoRs.
State v. Hoff man, Wash., 232 Pac. 278. "Manufacturing."
Defendant was guilty of manufacturing intoxicating liquor, under Rem.
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Comp. Stat. Sec. 7309, though- it did not appear that intoxicating liquor had
actually been produced, where it was shown that it was in process of manu-
facture; "manufacturing" meaning not only to produce or create, but covering
as well active efforts and means employed in making of intoxicating liquor.
JEOPARDY.
State v. Stiff, Kans., 231 Pac. 48.
A person who is brought to trial, on an information which, although de-
fective, sufficiently charges an offense to sustain a judgment on a verdict of
guilty, is placed in "jeopardy" when the jury is sworn to try the cause; and,
where the jury is afterward discharged for a reason other than one of those
contained in Sec. 60-2914 of the Revised Statutes, he cannot be again brought
to trial for the same offense charged in another information.
A defendant charged with a criminal offense cannot be said to have con-
sented to the discharge of a jury without a verdict, where, before pleading, his
motion to quash the information had been denied, and afterward a jury had
been sworn to try the cause, and was discharged before the introduction of
evidence, without the request of the defendant other than by his motion to
quash the information.
Dawson and Hopkins, JJ., dissenting.
JURIsDIcTION.
Salinger v. Loisel (U. S. Marshal), 44 Sup. Ct. Repr. 519. Crime of using
mail to defraud may be prosecuted at place of delivery of matter mailed.
One who, for purpose of executing fraudulent scheme, placed matter in post
office in one district for delivery to other person in other district, could be
prosecuted in other district, under Criminal Code Sec. 215 (Comp. St. See.
10385), making it a crime to "place, or cause to be placed, any letter
in any post office . . or authorized depository for mail matter," a letter
for purpose of executing fraudulent scheme; the crime having been committed
in other district in which letter was to be delivered.
PARDON.
State v. Magee Pub. Co., New Mex., 224 Pac. 1028. Power of governor to
pardon for criminal contempt.
Writing, printing, publishing, and circulating articles regarding a pending
case, in which the acts and conduct of the judge are discussed and criticized,
constitute "criminal" rather than civil-contempt.
Under constitutional grant of power the governor can pardon, after con-
viction, for criminal contempt.
"The offense is therefore one against the community when considered as a
social entity-it is one against the state, and the state, being the offended party,
has the power to extend grace or forgiveness. That power is exercised through
another department of the government, namely, the executive, and when he has
granted the same, the subject is freed and the incident closed. In the first
instance the sovereign state is represented by its judicial department, acting
through the particular court against which the contumacy is directed, and in the
second instance, by the executive department, acting through the governor."
Ryan, District Judge, dissenting.
